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THE SINGLE PUBLICATION RULE
In 1955, California, a focal state for radio and television activities, enacted the
Uniform Single Publication Act,' promulgated in 1952 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association.2 The
heart of this legislation is formed by the following two sections:
Sec. 3425.3. No person shall have more than one cause of action for damages for
libel or slander or invasion of privacy or any other tort founded upon any single pub-
lication or exhibition or utterance, such as one issue of a newspaper or book or maga-
zine or any one presentation to an audience or any one broadcast over radio or tele-
vision or any one exhibition of a motion picture. Recovery in any action shall in-
clude all damages for any such tort suffered by the plaintiff in all jurisdictions.
Sec. 3425.4. A judgment in any jurisdiction for or against the plaintiff upon the
substantive merits of any action for damages founded upon a single publication or
exhibition or utterance as described in section 3425.3 shall bar any other action for
damages by the same plaintiff against the same defendant founded upon the same
publication or exhibition or utterance.
The purpose of this legislation was to codify into statute the rule recently adopted
by several courts? that tortious interference by a single issue of a newspaper or
*LL.B. 1937, University of Michigan. Member of the California and District of Columbia bars.
Resident Counsel, Paramount Television Productions, Inc., and Paramount Sunset Corporation, Hollywood,
Cal. Author, RADIO AND TELEviSIoN L&w (1949), and RADIO AND TELEVISION RIGHTS (1953). The
opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflcct the
views of any other person, firm, or corporation.
'CAL. CIV. CoDE § 3425.1 et seq. (Supp. 1955). In addition to California, the following states
have adopted the Uniform Single Publication Act: Arizona, ARIz. RFv. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-2001-05 (Supp.
1954); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §§ 6-702-05 (Supp. 1955); North Dakota, N. D. REv. CODE § 14-0210-14
(Supp. 1953); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2090.1-5 (Supp. 1954).
'NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LA.ws, HANDBOOK (1952).
3 See, e.g., Hartmann v. Time, Inc., I66 F.2d 127 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948); Kilian
v. Stackpole Sons, 98 F. Supp. 500 (M.D. Pa. i95I); Stephenson v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 104 F.
Supp. 215 (S.D. Tex. 1952); Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 8i N.E.2d 45 (1948);
Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926
(1956).; Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955), afld, 232 F.2d 369
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 945 (1956); Fouts v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1s6 F. Supp. 535
(D. Conn. 1953); Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., ii6 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 1953); Dale System,
Inc., v. Time, Inc., 1i6 F. Supp. 527 (D. Conn. 1953); Dale System, Inc., v. General Teleradio, Inc., ios
F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). There is a growing body of literature on the single publication rule:
Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MIcH. L. REv. 959 (1953); Leflar, The Single Publication Rule, 25
ROCKY MT. L. REV. 263 (19s3);, Leflar, Choice of Law: Current Trends, 6 VAND. L. REV. 447 (1953);
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magazine or by a nationwide broadcast with a legally recognized right gives rise to a
single cause of action, whether the interference be by a defamatory utterance,4 an
invasion of privacy, ' the right of publicity,6 or unfair competitionZ Although
thousands of widely-distributed copies or a nationwide audience of viewers-listeners
may be involved, there is, in legal effect, but one integrated publication. The
number of copies sold or the extent of the audience do not create separate causes
of action; they go to the measure of damages and constitute competent proof as to
the degree of the injury suffered s
The foregoing statement is not intended as an all-inclusive definition of the
"single publication rule." The latter is one of the most complex and baffling doctrines
in our jurisprudence; it has been badly misunderstood and its meaning and scope
remain uncertain. As has been pointed out, "the words 'single publication rule'
became a catch-phrase exemplifying a type of reform vigorously favored by many
who felt that the law of libel was made up largely of historical anachronisms unsuited
to the practical needs of modern time. The phrase sounded good, regardless of what
it might mean in detailed application."9
The "single publication rule" is a very recent development in our jurisprudence;
it is a twentieth-century doctrine premised on modern methods of mass communica-
tion to the public-the newspaper and national magazine crossing state lines, the
motion picture exhibited in forty-eight states, and the nationwide radio-broadcast
or telecast.
The antithesis of the "single publication" doctrine was the old common-law rule,
as exemplified by Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer'° In that case, it was held that
each sale or delivery of a single copy of a newspaper or magazine was a distinct or
Remmers, Recent Legislative Trends in Defamation by Radio, 64 HAv. L. REv. 727 (i95i); Ludwig,
"Peace of Mind" in 48 Pieces v. Uniform Right of Privacy, 32 MNN. L. REv. 734 (X948); Note, 6o
HAgv. L. RMv. 941 (I947); Note, 28 N.Y.U. L. REv. ioo6 (1953); Note, 48 CoLum. L. REv. 932 (1948);
Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 CoLum. L. REv. 959 (1952); Morris, Proper
Law of a Tort, 64 HARv. L. REv. 881 (I951).
'See, e.g., Dale System v. Time, Inc., supra note 3; Fouts v. Fawcett Publications, Inc. supra note 3;
Dale System, Inc., v. General Teleradio, Inc., supra note 3.
'See, e.g., Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., I29 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955), affld, 232 F.2d
369 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 945 (956).
'Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 203 (1954)-
TSee, e.g., Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 351
U.S. 926 (1956).
8 Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. X949).
'Leflar, The Single Publication Rule, 25 RocKy Mr. L. REV. 263, 269 (1953). Palmisano v. News
Syndicate Co., 13o F. Supp. 17, i9 n. i (S.D.N.Y. X955): "The so-called 'single publication rule' which
embodies the composite tort concept has been applied in greatly varying legal contexts each of which
has policies and purposes which are at times inconsistent with the ends sought to be furthered in one
of the other legal contexts. For instance, the supposedly all-purpose 'single publication rule' may be
applied in these differing contexts; achieving joinder in one action of separate local libel claims; de-
termining, for purposes of the forum's statute of limitations, when a claim for libel based on successive
printings of a magazine or a book arose; determining the venue of a local libel claim as amongst the
various subdivisions of a state; and, for choice-of-law purposes, determining the single state whose laws
should apply to multi-state publication of a libel."
0 14 Q.B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1849).
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separate publication of a libel therein contained. This rule is still followed by several
jurisdictions." Thus, the application of the common-law rule means that when a
defamatory utterance is published in a magazine with national circulation, the person
defamed may have as many as 3,900,000 possible causes of actions for separate torts
based on the publication to each individual reader.Y2
The genesis of the "single publication rule" can be attributed to the statute-of-
limitations problems likewise presented by Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer. In that
case, the action was based on a defamatory statement appearing in a newspaper pub-
lished seventeen years before the action was brought. The defensive plea of the
then-existing statute of limitations, which was six years, was overruled. The court
held that the sale and delivery of the newspaper to plaintiff's agent seventeen years
after the date of its issue was a new publication.
A century later, the New York Court of Appeals, confronted with substantially
the same issue, applied a different statute of limitations to bar such a suit and, in so
doing, evolved the "single publication rule." In Gregoire v. G. B. Putnam's Sons,18
a book, allegedly containing defamatory material, was originally distributed in 1941;
it had gone through seven additional printings, the last of which was in 1943. In
the one-year period preceding the filing of the libel suit on July 2, 1946, only sixty
copies had been sold from stock. The New York statute of limitations for defamation
is one year. The court of appeals, in barring the claim, held that the rule of Duke
of Brunswick v. Harmer had its origin in an era which long antedated the modern
process of mass publication and nationwide distribution of printed information.
That rule also gave scant heed to the public policy which underlies statutes of limita-
tion, long regarded as "statutes of repose designed to outlaw stale claims.... Recog-
nizing that radical changes have been brought about by modern methods of dis-
seminating printed matter ... and desiring to avoid multiplicity of suits and to give
effect to statutes of limitations ... the publication of a defamatory statement in a
1 1 RE-TATEuNrT, TORTS § 578, comment b (X938): "Each time a libelous article is brought to the
attention of a third person, a new publication has occurred, and each publication is a separate tort. Thus
each time a libelous book or paper or magazine is sold, a new publication has taken place which, if the
libel is false and unprivileged, will support a separate action for damages against seller. So, too, each
time a libelous article is reprinted or redistributed, a new publication is made and a fresh tort com-
mitted." To the same effect: Hartmann v. American News Co., 69 F. Supp. 736 (W.D. Wis. 1947),
aff'd, 17x F.2d 581 (7 th Cir. 1948); Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Wash. 1943);
O'Reilly v. Curtis Publishing Co., 3i F. Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1940). Compare Renfro Drug Co. v. Law-
son, 138 Tex. 434, i6o S.W.2d 246 (1942), with Stephenson v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 104 F. Supp.
215 (S.D. Texas 1952). See, also, MARTIN L. NEWELL, Thn LAw oF SLANDER AND LIBEL IN CIVIL AND
CuMNAL CAsES §§ 175, 192 (4th ed. 1924).
5
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COM SSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LA-vs, HANDBOOK 432-33 (1952);
Leflar, The Single Publication Rule, 25 RocKY MT. L. REv. 263 (953).
i2"98 N.Y. 1i9, 8i N.E.2d 45 (1948). The holding in the Gregoire case was foreshadowed in
Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, 254 App. Div. 211, 4 N.Y.S.2d 640 (4 th Dep't 1938), afd without
opinion, 279 N.Y. 76, 18 N.E.2d 676, rehearing denied, 28o N.Y. 572, 2o N.E.2d 21 (1939). To the
same effect: Means v. Macfadden Publications, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Cannon v. Time,
Inc., 39 F. Supp. 66o (S.D.N.Y. X939); Age-Herald Pub. Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193
(1921); Forman v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 14 So.2d 344 (1943); McGlue v. 'Weekly
Publications, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 744 (D. Mass. 1947); Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 78 N.E.2d
708 (r948).
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single issue of a newspaper, or a single issue of a magazine, although such issues
consist of thousands of copies widely distributed, is, in legal effect, one publication
which gives rise to one cause of action and that the applicable statute of limitations
runs from the date of that publication."' 4
The philosophic basis of the "single publication rule" is the danger of multiple
lawsuits which could plague and harass publishers of national magazines and news-
papers and national and regional networks and broadcastersY5 Similarly, the ex-
tension of statutes of limitations, because one copy of the original edition is dis-
tributed at a later date, might extend liability more or less indefinitely.' 6
The significance of the "single publication rule" is that the entire edition of a
newspaper or magazine constitutes a single publication, giving rise to one cause of
action within the state. The mailing of late copies,' 7 or sales from stock,'" or reading
defamatory material in defendants' files' 9 is still part of the original publication.
Whether the single publication would extend to a subsequent edition of a newspaper
or a new edition of the same book is still an open question, though probably publica-
tion of the same defamatory article in a later edition of the newspapers would give
rise to a new cause of action ° The Gregoire case, which involved seven printings
of the same book, suggests a different rule, but a careful reading of the opinion indi-
cates that there were seven successive libels-the last of which became actionable in
1944, when distribution of the final printing was begun, and still more than two years
before the plaintiff brought his action.
Ii
INTERSTATE PUBLICATION AND THE SINGLE PUBLICATION RULE
The foregoing discussion relates to the application of the "single publication rule"
within one state. The problems became infinitely more complex in interstate publica-
14 298 N.Y. at 123, 126, 81 N.E.2d at 47.
2r Prosser, supra note 3, at 969: "The 'chain libel suit' which can result is no figment of the imagina-
tion. Professor Hartman brought six suits against Life for calling him subversive and a fascist. The late
Annie Oakley, currently famed in "Annie Get Your Gun," once was reported by the Associated Press
to have been arrested as a drug addict, and proceeded to bring fifty different actions against as many
newspapers, of which she won forty-eight, with damages ranging from $5oo.oo to $27,500.00. An Ohio
congressman named Sweeny, who was accused in Pearson and Allen's syndicated column of being a
spokesman for Father Coughlin and opposing the appointment of a foreign-born Jew to the federal bench,
brought a number of actions which has been reported as anywhere from sixty-eight to three hundred,
claiming a total of damages estimated at $7,5oo,ooo, with at least fifteen reported opinions in the courts."
" See note 13 supra.17McGlue v. Weekly Publications, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 744 (D. Mass. z947); Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334
Ill. App. 59, 78 N.E.2d 708 (1948); Backus v. Look, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
's Gregoire v. Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. i9, 8i N.E.2d 45 (1948).
20 Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254 App. Div. 211 (4 th Dep't 1938), afl'd without opinion,
279 N.Y. 716, s8 N.E.2d 676, rehearing denied, 28o N.Y. 572, 2o N.E.2d 21 (1939).
" Backus v. Look, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Means v. Macfadden Publications, Inc.,
25 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Mack Miller Candle Co. v. Macmillan Co., 239 App. Div. 738, 269
N.Y. Supp. 33 (4 th Dep't 1934), aff'd, 266 N.Y. 489, x95 N.E. 167 (i934); Sharpe v. Larson, 70
Minn. 209, 72 N.W. 961 (1897).
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tions, as demonstrated by Hartmann v. Time, Inc.21 Hartmann brought an action in
the Federal District Court of Pennsylvania to recover damages for an allegedly libel-
ous article published by defendant in Life magazine, which was circulated through-
out the forty-eight states and many foreign countries2 Federal jurisdiction was
based on diversity of citizenship, so that under the teachings of Erie R. Co. v. Tomp-
kins,23 state law, including state rules of conflict of laws, was required to be applied.
The trial court, finding that Pennsylvania adhered to the "single publication" rule,
held that Hartmann's one and only cause of action accrued at the time of initial
publication in Illinois and was barred by the Pennsylvania statute of limitations. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed that Pennsylvania would
follow the "single publication rule." However, as a person's reputation is damaged
wherever a statement libeling him is read, the court would also examine the law of
each state where publication occurred. Since Illinois followed the "single publica-
tion" rule, and since the cause of action was barred by the one-year Pennsylvania
statute of limitations, the Illinois publication of the accused magazine issue en-
grossed, as it were, the Pennsylvania publication. Since there was but one cause of
action in both states, the Pennsylvania statute of limitations effectively barred the
action in both, and in all jurisdictions having the "single publication rule." In those
states which adhered to the multiple-publication theory, each publication could result
in fresh causes of action, which would not necessarily be barred by the Pennsylvania
statute of limitations. The court, therefore, partially vacated the judgment of the
lower court and remanded with instructions to decide the case with reference to the
laws of those multiple-publication states where the magazine had circulated.
The Hartmann case has far-reaching implications. In applying the "single publica-
tion rule" across state lines, it concluded that the facts constituted a single tort
committed in the place of earliest publication and radiating into other states only in its
damaging effects. In applying the multiple-publication theory in regard to those
states not bound by the "single publication rule," the decision imposed an onerous
task on the lower court. The latter would be required to wade through and digest
the law of forty-eight states to determine the existence of a cause of action in defama-
tion, privacy, publicity, or unfair competition. The same inquiry would be required
for pleas of privilege or other matters of defense. The task before a trial judge in
instructing the jury as to the law of libel or privacy of each jurisdiction, or the various
peculiarities concerning damages, defies imagination.
2 4
2z 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948).
"' 64 F. Supp. 671 (EfD. Pa. 1946).
28304 U.S. 64 (1939).
5
'Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897, 900 (2d Cir. 1949): "The difficulty is that in hpplica-
tion it would prove unmanageable. . . . It would certainly be an unworkable procedure to tell a jury
that they should award damages, so far as they were suffered in State X, according to one measure, and,
so far as they were suffered in State Y, according to another."
Curley v. Curtis Publishing Co., 48 F. Supp. 29, 39 n.3 (D. Mass. 1942): "An attempt to apply a
checkerboard set of legal rules would be impractical either in determining the admissibility of evidence




The Hartmann case tenders another problem which the court bypassed without
comment. In a jurisdiction applying the "single publication rule," what law de-
termines whether an act is a tort? One illustration will suffice. New York holds
that the fictionalized version of a person's life for commercial gain, using his true
name or picture, constitutes an invasion of his right of privacy 5 The same set of
facts would not constitute an actionable invasion of privacy in Utah,
26 Wisconsin,27
and perhaps the District of Columbia.28 The choice of law, i.e., what law governs,
is of the utmost importance. Needless to say, there is no agreement among the
courts on this issue. "There are at least ten different and inconsistent theories as to
the applicable law, which from time to time have been adopted by some court or
suggested by learned writers. No one of them, unless it be the last, can be said to
have prevailed and that one only by default.' 29 The various theories are as follows:
I. The law of each place of "impact." This is the multiple-publication theory30
and for defamation cases is followed by the Restatement of the Conflicts of Law.3
This theory nullifies the "single publication rule."
2. Place of last event. The general Restatement choice of law rule is that the
governing law be supplied by the place where the last event takes place which "is
necessary to make an actor liable."32  In defamation and privacy cases, this is the
place where publication occurs2 3 In radio and television, the circumstance that
'
5 Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 2o N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. iio8 (1913); ci. Freed v. Loew's, Inc., 175 Misc.
616, 24 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup. Ct. 1940). See also, HARRY P. WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION RIGHrS
§ 275b (1953), and Garner v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. i951).
"
8 Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177 (1954). Cf. Donahue v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, 194 F.8d 6 (ioth Cir. 1953), noted in 3 UTAH L. REV. 247 (1953).
"IPrst v. Stein, 220 Wis. 354, 265 N.W. 85 (1936); Judevine v. Benzies-Montanye Fuel & Ware-
house Co., 222 Wis. 512, 269 N.W. 295 (1936); Comment, 1952 Wis. L. REV. 507 (1952).
58 Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd, 232 F.ad 369
(D.C. Cir.), Mrt. denied, 352 U.S. 945 (1956).
2' Prosser, supra note 3, at 971. "There is, however, the further question of what law is to govern
each one of the forty-nine causes of action, or any of the component questions of law which may arise
in connection with it, and on this, too, there is no agreement. The realm of the conflict of laws is a
dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who
theorize about mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon. The ordinary court, or
lawyer, is quite lost when engulfed and entangled in it." Ibid.
On this problem, see Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multi-State Torts: Law and
Reason Versus the Restatement, 36 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1951); Leflar, Choice of Law: Torts: Current
Trends, 6 VAND. L. REv. 447 (953); Note, 63 HAsv. L. REV. 822 (195o).
"°O'Reilly v. Curtis Publishing Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1940); Holden v. American News
Co., 52 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Wash. 1943), appeal dismissed, 144 F.2d 249 (9 th Cir. 1944); see Jenner
v. Sun Oil Co., [1952] ONT. L. REP. 240; Kilian v. Stackpole Sons, 98 F. Supp. 5oo (M.D. Pa. 1951).
31REsTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 377 (1934): "The place of wrong is in the state where
the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place." Rule 5 under this
section provides: "Where harm is done to the reputation of a person, the place of wrong is where the
defamatory statement is communicated." Illustration 7 likewise provides: "A, broadcasting in State X,
slanders B. B is well and favorably known in State Y and the broadcast is heard by many people con-
versant with B's good repute. The place of wrong is Y."
'Ibid. See also, REsTATEmENT, TORTS § 578(b) (1938).
" Cf. Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 3o F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). See Notes, 6o HAv.
L. REV. 941, 946 (1947); 66 HAv. L. REV. 1041, 1049 (1949);-16 U. Cm. L. REv. 164, 167 (1949).
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transmission is both simultaneous and multijurisdictional presents difficulty in de-
termining the "last event."
3. The law of the place of defendant's act. This would be the place at which
a broadcast34 was made or a magazine or newspaper was published."5 This has been
criticized in that it would enable a wrongdoer to pick the law that would govern
his act, a choice that might result in some state becoming a haven for defaming
broadcasters and publishers. This standard is deficient in its application to nation-
wide telecasts. The infringing act may originate in a remote area hundreds of miles
from the New York or Los Angeles studiosO0  Where, then, does the act occur?
4. The law of defendant's principal place of business. The objection to this
theory"' is that it is difficult to determine at times the principal place of business of
corporate defendants. In addition, the principal place of business may have no real
connection with either the act of publication or any injury resulting therefrom.
5. The state of defendant's incorporation or domicile. This approach meets the
same objections as the use of defendant's principal place of business.,
6. The law of the state of principal circulation. This was suggested by defendant
in Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co. but rejected by the court3 9 It would
mean that the law of New York frequently would govern since that state contains
the largest potential circulation or audience.
7. The law of the place of plaintiffs domicile. This standard has frequently
been employed by the courts, particularly in defamation40 and privacy 41 cases. This
is because the reputation of an individual or his peace of mind is most affected in the
locality where he is domiciled. This standard is objectionable where an individual
may be domiciled in Connecticut but is employed in New York City. 2
"Mau v. Rio Grande Oil Co., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. x939); but cf. Gautier v. Pro Football
League, 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952).
3'Layne v. Kirby, 208 Cal. 694, 284 Pac. 441 (1930); Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 151 F.2d 733
(2d Cir. 1946).
"
0 In Gautier v. Pro Football League, 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (x952), the alleged infringing
act originated in Washington, D. C., and plaintiff sought recovery in New York.
"
7 United States v. Smith, 173 Fed. 227 (D. Ind. i9o9); Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co.
v. Panther-Panco Rubber Co., 153 F.2d 662 (xst Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 722 (1946). In
Caldwell v. Crowel-Collier Publishing Co., 161 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1947), and AddressographoMultigraph
Corp. v. American Expansion Bolt & Mfg. Co., 124 F.2d 7o6 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316
U.S. 682 (1942), the court applied the law of the place where plaintiff had its principal business.
"
3 Notes, 43 ILL. L. REv. 556 (1948); 35 VA. L. REv. 627 (1949). See also, American Radio Stores
v. American Radio and Television Stores Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 127, 15o Ad. i8o (Ch. 1930).
so 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955), afL'd, 232 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 945
(1956)3 see Dale System, Inc. v. General Teleradio, Inc., io5 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Cf.
Palmer v. Mahnin, 12o Fed. 737 (8th Cir. 1903).
40 Szalatny-Stacho v. Fink, [1947] K.B. 1, [1946] 1 All E.R. 303; Fouts v. Fawcett Publications,
is6 F. Supp. 535 (D. Conn. 1953); Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1x6 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn.
1953); Dale System, Inc. v. Time, Inc., ix6 F. Supp. 527 (D. Conn. 1953). Cf. Caldwell v. Crowell-
Collier Publishing Co., i6i F.2d 333 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 766 (1947). In the following
cases, the courts refused to apply the law of plaintiff's domicile: Christopher v. American News Co., 171
F.2,d 275 (7th Cir. 1941); Dale System, Inc. v. General Teleradio, Inc., io5 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y.
1952).
" Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955), afl'd, 232 F.2d 369
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 945 (1956); Ludwig, supra note 3.
42 Prosser, supra note 3, at 976: "Apart from the usual difficulty in determining where domicil may
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8. The law of the place where plaintiff has his dominant contacts. A refinement
of the domiciliary theory, this standard has been applied in several of the unfair
competition cases on the theory that this responds to what constitutes the greatest
interference with plaintiff's interests.43 The Bernstein case utilized this test since
the plaintiff, although domiciled in Virginia, spent the work-week in Washington,
D.C., and hence had his dominant contacts in the nation's capital. Judge Learned
Hand has likewise applied this standard in a defamation case 4 The objection to
this theory is that it is--"entirely unpredictable ... [and] impossible to determine in
the case of interstate defamatory broadcasts or invasions of privacy, as imposing
the law of the more populous states on the rest, and as quite arbitrary where, for
example, there are forty jurisdictions involved and the greatest damage in any one is
6% of the total, against 5%/ for the next state.14
Nonetheless, it is believed that the theory of "predominant contacts" is a workable
rule. In the defamation cases, there is a twofold injury to the plaintiff-injury to his
character or reputation in the eyes of others, and also mental suffering to the indi-
vidual resulting from the foregoing.4 6 In the privacy cases, the gravamen of the
action is injury to the feelings of the plaintiff, the mental distress and anguish caused
by the publication.47 In both privacy and defamation cases, injury is measured
primarily in terms of distress suffered by the plaintiff. The locale of plaintiff's
dominant contacts suggests itself as a workable criterion, since here has occurred the
greatest interference with plaintiff's peace of mind.
9. The law of the forum. This is the theory most frequently applied by the courts
because of convenience, 48 because the issue was never raised by the litigants, 49 or
be, this is open to the objection that the publication may have little effect there, or may never reach
the place at all, and that where a man of national reputation lives in Nevada the injury in the state
may be insignificant in comparison with the whole."
" Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Oil City Refiners, 136 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
798 (1943); Triangle Publications v. New England Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 198 (D. Mass. 1942).
"Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1949). To the same effect: Kelly v. Loew's,
Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948); Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 1o7 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Banks
v. King Feature Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Caldwell v. Crowell-Collier Publishing
Co., x61 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 766 0947).
" Prosser, supra note 3, at 973-74.
"Marble v. Chapin, 132 Mass. 225 (i88).
"7Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955), afl'd, 232 F.2d 369
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 945 (1956); Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 295,
3o5-6, z62 P.2d 133 (i945). See Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 750 (1950); HARRY P. WARNER, RADIO AND
TELEvSIoN Ri-HTs 1128 (1953).
" Spanel v. Pegler, i6o F.2d 619 (7 th Cir. 1949); Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 151 F.2d 733 (2d
Cir. 1945); Loyne v. Kirby, 2o8 Cal. 694, 284 Pac. 441 (1930); Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
194 F.2d 6 (ioth Cir. 1952); Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 30
(1939); Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Wash. 1943) appeal dismissed, 144
F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1944); Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3 d Cir. i951); Caldwell
v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., i6i F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 766 (947).
" Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (931); Gautier v. Pro-Football League, 304 N.Y.
354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952); Kelly v. Loew's, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948); cf. Mattox v.
News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1949); Mau v. Rio Grande Oil Co., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D.
Cal. 1939).
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because damages are restricted to one state.5° This theory has likewise been criticized.
The forum is not always the jurisdiction most significantly connected with the con-
troversy. Since jurisdiction over defendants engaged in nationwide communications
may be had in almost every state, plaintiffs may engage in "forum-shopping" with
its obvious evils.51
Although there is no clear line of cases preferring one theory over the others,
there is a trend, as evidenced by the more recent cases, to apply the law of plaintiff's
domicile52 or, as in Bernstein, the "predominant contacts" theory. 3 Unfortunatedy,
the Uniform Single Publication Act furnishes no aid or comfort in advising a court
as to the choice of law. California and other states which have adopted this legisla-
tion are free to apply the law of the forum, the "predominant contacts" theory, or the
law of plaintiff's domicile. Still, the statute has several advantages over the common-
law rule, and it is believed that recovery in a state adopting the Act would include
damages for the plaintiff's whole wrong. Indeed, one commentator has concluded
that the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution absolutely precludes recovery
even in states rejecting the "single publication rule" in any later action elsewhere for
any part of that whole wrong.'
There is an additional facet of the "single publication rule" which warrants dis-
cussion. May California in a multiple-publication tort apply its law not only for the
injury sustained there, but also for that incurred in the forty-seven other states?
The trial convenience in applying the law of one state and instructing the jury on
California law only, rather than the laws of New York, Virginia, Maryland, etc., is
readily apparent. Judge Learned Hand intimated in Mattox v. News Syndicate Co.
the desirability of such an approach, though this was only dictum."'
In the Bernstein case, involving a multiple-state privacy action, the court went
one step further, applied the "single publication rule," and utilized the law of the
District of Columbia in each of the states where plaintiff was seeking damages. In
granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court had this to say: "If a
tortious invasion of privacy be held to have occurred, damages for the injury to
plaintiff's feelings would be assessed under the law of the one jurisdiction which
is determined to have been his situs, but he could recover there for the whole amount
of harm inflicted on his feelings, considering, among other factors, the extent of
the publication or publications in that and other jurisdictions. ' " Thus, in Bernstein,
'*Hartmann v. American News Co., 69 F. Supp. 736 (W.D. Wis. 1947); Levey v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, 57 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir.
195r).
"
1Ludwig, supra note 3, at 760; Prosser, supra note 3, at 977-78.
" Dale System, Inc. v. Time, Inc., ix6 F. Supp. 527, 530 (D. Conn. 1953); Fouts v. Fawcett
Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 535 (D. Conn. 1953); Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., xx6 F. Supp.
535 (D. Conn. X953). Cf. Palmisano v. News Syndicate Co., 13o F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
' See notes 43 and 44, supra.
Leflar, The Single Publication Rule, 25 RocxY MT. L. REV. 263, 276 (1953).
176 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1949). See also Curley v. Curtis Publishing Co., 48 F. Supp. 29 (D. Mass.
1942); National Fruit Produce Co. v. Dwinnel-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass. x942).
" Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. at 826.
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this issue was tendered the court, which applied the law of a single jurisdiction as
to each state wherein publication occurred.
IV
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The Bernstein formula poses several unresolved constitutional issues. May a
court apply the substantive law of one state to publications occurring in other juris-
dictions? For example, plaintiff brings a multiple-state privacy action in the Cali-
fornia courts, seeking damages in such jurisdictions as Nebraska and Wisconsin.
These two states have rejected the privacy doctrine. 7 If the telecast constitutes an
actionable invasion of plaintiff's privacy, the court would be confronted with the
question of whether plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for publication in Ne-
braska and Wisconsin. Since these two jurisdictions refuse on grounds of local public
policy to hear this kind of suit, the California court would presumably refuse to grant
recovery for publication in these states. California cannot justifiably seek to create
greater rights than do the local laws of Nebraska or Wisconsin. 5
Assume, though, facts similar to Mau v. Rio Grande Oil Co., 9 wherein plaintiff's
action in California for invasion of privacy was sustained, despite defendant's plea
that the questioned broadcast was a matter of legitimate public interest. The courts
in the District of Columbia60 and Georgia"' apply an enlarged test of legitimate
public interest which is at variance with the holding of the California courts. Thus,
had plaintiff brought suit in Washington, D. C., or Georgia, there would have been
no recovery. It is hornbook law that the legislative authority of every state is confined
to the territorial limits of that state and that California law does not have any
effect of its own force beyond the limits of its own sovereignty. 2 And so a consti-
tutional issue is revealed which has hardly been explored in discussions relating to
the "single publication rule."
The constitutional issue posed by the Bernstein formula is the reverse of the
usual torts-conflicts of law problem; there a court must determine whether it will
provide a forum for extrastate claims. The contention may be made that to enforce
the claim in the forum would be contrary to the local public policy of the juris-
diction, 3 that it would result in the enforcement of the penal laws of another state,64
57Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 43, 75 N.W.2d 925 (z956); Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161
Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955).
11 See HERBERT F. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 21, 223 (3d ed. 1949); G. W.
STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAws 198 (2d ed. 1951).
1028 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
Co Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 369.
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 945 (1956).
"' Waters v. Fleetwood, 2x2 Ga. x6i, 91 S.E.2d 344 (1956).
"OHilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294
U.S. 532, 541 (1935): ". . . similar power to control the legal consequences of a tortious act committed
elsewhere has been denied."
03 See, e.g., Muir v. Kessinger, 35 F. Supp. I6 (ElD. Wash. 1940); Hudson v. Van Hamm, 85 Cal.
App. 323, 259 Pac. 374 (1927); Kyle v. Kyle, 2xo Minn. 204, 297 N.W. 744 (194i).
C" Adams v. Fitchberg Ry., 67 Vt. 76, 30 Ad. 687 (1894). See also 63 A.L.R. 1330 (1929).
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or that the judicial machinery is unavailable to enforce extrastate law. 5 The point
is raised that under the constitutional requirement of full faith and credit to the
"public acts" of every other state, a state may not refuse to entertain a foreign action,
such as wrongful death, arising under the acts of another state when there is no clear
showing that strong public policy of the forum is violated by the action brought.60
Mr. Justice Jackson's language in the United Air Lines case here is pertinent:"1
For the essence of the Full-Faith and Credit Clause is that certain transactions, wherever
in the United States they may be litigated, shall have the same legal consequences as they
would have in the place where they occurred.
Undoubtedly, a substantial constitutional argument can be made that a court,
in applying the "single publication rule," would be precluded from recognizing a
cause of action, such as invasion of privacy, or a defense, such as retraction in a def-
amation case, with respect to publication in a sister state which refuses to recog-
nize the same action or defense. As long as full faith and credit must be given,
it can be persuasively contended that the "single publication rule" cannot be in-
voked by plaintiff to create a new cause of action or by a defendant to assert a new
defense in a foreign jurisdiction which refuses to recognize the same. Despite the
constitutional issues tendered by the full faith and credit clause, the Supreme Court
could readily conclude that practical considerations require the law of a single state
to be applied as to publication in the forty-seven other states. The task before a
court in attempting to ascertain and apply the law governing defamation in forty-
eight jurisdictions, with its varied defenses, is staggering and defies imagination."8
The full faith and credit clause would have to yield to the practical considerations
governing the docket of a trial court.
Practical considerations-such as court work-load-have been persuasive factors
in shaping and molding constitutional doctrines. One illustration will suffice. Over
the years, the Supreme Court has evolved the rules governing the relationships be-
"' Slater v. Mexican National Ry., 194 U. S. 120 (1904).
"Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 ('95i). See Notes, 64 HtAv. L. REv. 327 (1950), 51 Mslc. L.
REV. 267 (1952).
"' First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396, 400 (1952).
68 See note 24, supra. See Wyzanski, J., in National Fruit Produce Co. v. Dwinnel-Wright Co.,
47 F. Supp. 499, 504 (D. Mass. 1942): "1 prefer to believe that the Massachusetts court has the robust
common sense to avoid writing opinions and entering decrees adapted with academic nicety to the
vagaries of forty-eight states. And until Massachusetts adopts a checker-board jurisprudence, the Klaxon
case does not require this court to do so."
See Goodrich, J., in Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974, 975 (3d Cir. 1951): "This is the
kind of case where, if all of the questions which could be pointed up by analysis were to be answered,
we should find ourselves in a forest from which it would be pretty hard to escape. Where was the
right of privacy invaded, for instance: Alabama where the plaintiff lived, Pennsylvania where the Satur-
day Evening Post was published, or eVery state in the Union to which the Post goes? If so, is there a
separate lawsuit for each invasion? Does recovery in one action for one invasion preclude suit in some
other state for another invasion? Because Pennsylvania has the 'single-publication' rule in defamation,
is the same thing true for invasion of privacy? Questions similar to this the court was compelled to face
in Hartmann v. Time, Inc. (3d Cir. 1948), 166 F.2d 127, 1 A.L.R.2d 370. Fortunately, for judicial peace
of mind, we do not have to face them here."
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tween courts and administrative agencies." A federal appellate court today cannot
review de novo the factual determinations of an administrative agency. The so-
called jurisdictional or constitutional fact doctrine, which permitted a court to review
de novo the findings of an administrative agency, yielded to the work-load confront-
ing appellate courts.70 The size of the records and the volume of cases on appeal was
an important factor in prompting the Supreme Court to adopt the self-imposed
limitation on reviewing courts-that the findings of fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive.71 With practical factors in mind, it is believed that the
courts will consider the full faith and credit clause to be consistent with the adoption
and extension of the Bernstein formula to the "single publication rule."
V
DEFAMATION
There have been several cases which have discussed the application of the "single
publication rule" to defamatory utterances over radio and television. The areas of
controversy surrounding broadcast or telecast defamation highlight the need for the
U'single publication rule" to limit issues to workable bounds where a program has
been received in several states.
Many radio and television defamation cases have been concerned with such issues
as whether the tort is libel72 or slander 73 Thus, if a broadcaster reads from a
script, it is considered libel; on the other hand, an ad-lib interpolation is considered
slander.74 Other courts have suggested that defamation by radio be treated as a "new
tort," containing the characteristics of both libel and slander and subject to a standard
of due care."5 The cases are likewise in conflict on the issue whether defamation by
television constitutes libel or slander.76 The courts agree that motion pictures would
00 KENNETH C. DAvis, CASES ON AmsINS'aWArvE LAw 868 et seq. (i95i); Universal Camera Corp.
v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Jaffe, Judicial Review: Substantial Evidence of the Whole Record, 64
H~Av. L. REv. 1233 (I95i); F. E. COOPER, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS c. 18, at 330 et
-eq. (r9.5i).
" Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); St. Joseph Stockyards v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (936).
See Jaffe, Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact, 7o HtAv. L. REV. 953 (957).
" Section xo(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 6o STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1oo9(c)
(1952), embodies this legislation.7 Sorenson v. Wood, x23 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932); Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8
F. Supp.. 889 (N.D. Mo. 1934).
" Meldrum v. Australian Broadcasting Co., [1932] Viar. L. REv. 425. See HAluRY P. WARNER,
RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW § 37, at 444 (5953).
"' See WARNER, loc. cit. supra note 73. See also Hartman v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30
(x947); Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N.Y. Supp. 188 (Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd, 253 App. Div.
887, 2 N.Y.S.2d io5 (ist Dep't 1938); Weglein v. Golder, 317 Pa. 437, 177 At. 47 (r935).
" Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting CO., 337 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939); Kelly v. Hoffman,
137 N.J.L. 695, 61 A.2d 143 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948); Irwin v. Ashurst, x58 Ore. 61, 74 P.2d 1127
(1938).
"Remington v. Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) held that defamation by television was
slander. Contra, Shor v. Billingsley et al., 14 R.R. 2053 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. x956); Landau v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, xo R.R. 2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954).
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be considered libel;7" in the case of theatrical film, exhibited over television broad-
cast stations, the same rule would undoubtedly apply.
In addition to such disputed issues, viz., whether the tort is libel, slander, or both,
there is a raging controversy as to whether broadcasters should be held accountable
to the same standard of strict liability as newspapers.Ps The cases are evenly divided,
with four holding the station to be stricdy liable, 9 and four applying the standard
of due care. 0 In this connection, a large number of states have enacted legislation
which mitigates a broadcaster's liability for defamatory statements made by persons
who are not agents of the broadcaster if the latter has exercised due care to prevent
the utterance of such statements."' Two states have gone so far as to relieve the
broadcaster of liability for defamation by persons who are not agents, regardless of
any negligence on the part of the broadcaster."2
Defamation by radio and television is further complicated by section 315 of the
Communications Act of 1934.83 That provision requires a station to afford equal
opportunities to all legally qualified candidates for public office and precludes a station
from exercising any power of censorship over the material broadcast8 4 The legisla-
tive history and background of this provision indicated that, in the absence of federal
control in this area, the common law and state statutes on libel and slander were
deemed sufficient to protect the civil rights of any individual who had been de-
famed."'
From the inception of federal control of broadcasting in 1927 to 1948, broadcasters
had examined political scripts and had deleted material which, in their opinion, was
defamatory."" But in the Port Huron decision, published in 1948, the Federal
Communications Commission advised the industry that "the prohibition of section
315 against any censorship by licensees of political speeches by candidates for office
"'Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, 5o T.L.R. 581, 99 A.L.R. 864 (1934); Kelly v.
Loew's, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948).
s See WAEaR, loc. cit. supra note 73.
' Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (932); Miles v. Louis Wasmer, 172 Wash. 466,
20 P.2d 847 (1933); Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Mo. 1934); Irwin v.
Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P.2d 1127 (1938).
"o Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 337 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (I939); Josephson v.
Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Mis. 787, 38 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Kelly v. Hoffman, 137
N.J.L. 695, 61 A.2d 143 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948); Parker v. Silver City Crystal Co., 12 R.R. 2o57 (D.
Conn. x955).
S1 ee, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 48.5 (1949); MxcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1405-06 (Supp. 1953). Se
Reummers, supra note 3; Leflar, Radio and TV Defamation: "Fault" or Strict Liability, 15 Oio ST. L. J.
252 (1954).
"
2 Miss. Laws, c. 250, at 274 (954); N. D. REV. CODE § 14-0209 (Supp. 1953).
8"48 STAT. 1o88 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 315 (952).
"' 1, 315(a). If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any
public office to use a broadcasting station, be shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates
for that office in the use of such broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power
of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed
upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate."
"
3 H.AtY P. WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW § 32 (1949).
"
8Id. § 39; and see Voliva v. Station WCBD, 313 Il1. App. 177, 39 N.E.2d 685 (1942); Rose v.
Brown, x86 Misc. 553, 58 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1945).
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is absolute and no exception exists in the case of material which is either libelous or
might tend to involve the station in an action for damages. '" 7
The Commission was then faced with this problem: Several of the state courts
had held broadcasters responsible for defamatory remarks uttered over a station in a
political broadcast. 8 These decisions, in effect, affirmed the right of broadcast
licensees to examine political scripts and to delete such material which was defama-
tory in character. The Commission answered this contention by concluding that
Congress had pre-empted this field of censorship and thus relieved licensees of
both power to delete and responsibility for any defamatory matter broadcast in a
political speech. The Commission's conclusion as to liability of the broadcaster
would not, of course, bind the courts.
Although this situation has been discussed at great length in Congress, no federal
remedial legislation has been enacted to resolve the dilemma of the broadcaster. In
the absence of congressional relief, broadcasters have appealed to their state legis-
latures for help. The latter have enacted legislation giving the broadcaster complete
immunity from political defamatory utterances.
8 9
The Commission's decision in the Port Huron case portends a possible solution
for the vexatious problems in this troublesome field. Clearly radio and television are
interstate communications premised on the commerce clause of the Constitution;"°
and Congress, in enacting the Communications Act of 1934, has pre-empted this field
to the exclusion of the states. This pre-emption could be extended to torts in inter-
state publication.9 Such legislation, if adopted by Congress, could adopt the
Bernstein formula of the "single publication rule." It could go further and spell out
whether defamation by radio is libel or slander, whether a broadcaster should be
held accountable to the rule of strict liability. The area of privilege also could be
delineated, and the statute might declare the effect of a retraction or of the plain-
tiff's failure to demand the same.
Let us retreat from the field of possible legislation to the published decisions
dealing with the application of the "single publication rule" to defamatory utterances
over radio and television. Dale System v. Time, Inc.,92 involved a multistate libel
effectuated by the publication of Life and a broadcast over radio station WOR.
" Re Port Huron Broadcasting Co. 12 F.C.C. io69 (1948). See also Houston Post Co. v. United
States, 79 F. Supp. 199, 203 (S.D. Texas 1948); HRY P. WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW § 34e
(1949).
13 See cases cited note 79 supra.
"'See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.105 (1953); N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 580, § I. See also Felix
v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, i86 F.2d I (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 909 ('95'); Note,
30 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 126, X37 (1956). But see the recent case of Farmers' Cooperative Union v.
Townley, z5 R.R. 2058 (D. N.D. 1957), wherein it was held that a state statute absolving a broadcast
station from any liability for libel, slander, or negligence is unconstitutional. This case is on appeal.
" Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtg. Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933).
"' See Second Employers' Liability Act Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (19x2); O'Brien v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 13 F.2d 539 (ist Cir. 1940); Vaigneur v. Western Union Tel. Co., 34 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Tenn.
1940); Haviland v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 F Supp. 438 (S.D. Texas x954). Note, 67 HARv. L.
REV. 347 (1953).
02 xx6 F. Supp. 527 (D. Conn. 1953).
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Plaintiff alleged that an article published in Life and summarized in the Reader's
Digest was libelous in that it injured plaintiff's business. The summary in the
Reader's Digest was broadcast over Station WOR. "The broadcast took place from
a studio in New York City, but was accomplished through a transmitter located in
New Jersey. The broadcast could be heard from Massachusetts to Georgia.""3
The court held that the publications in Life and Reader's Digest and the broadcast
constituted "three torts." Despite the publication of the libel in more than three
states, the court applied the "single publication rule" and also decided that the law
of plaintiff's domicile was the law to be applied to a multistate libel which had been
communicated in the state of plaintiff's domicile as well as in other jurisdictions.
The significance of this decision is that a lower court not only applied the "single
publication rule" but went one step further, utilized the Bernstein formula, and
applied the substantive law of the domicile to govern publications in other jurisdic-
tions, ie., from Massachusetts to Georgia.
Hawser v. Pearson,4 with an almost identical factual pattern, is squarely in con-
flict. There, plaintiff brought a libel action, claiming that a broadcast originating in
the District of Columbia and heard in California and nine other western states was
defamatory. Judge Holtzoff, rejecting the "single publication rule," held that "libel
and slander take place where the defamatory statement is communicated and not in
the place from which the offending material is sent or where it originates. ... [T]he
substantive law of each of the States in which the defamatory matter was circulated
should govern the rights and liabilities of the parties in respect to so much of the
circulation of the offending material as took place in that State." ' Thus, Bernstein
and Hawser v. Pearson, from the same jurisdiction, are in conflict on the application
of the "single publication rule."
The last case to be discussed under this topic is Dale System, Inc. v. General
Teleradio, Inc.,9" a multistate libel action, with the broadcast originating in New
York City and heard by listeners from Maine to North Carolina and as far west as
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and elsewhere. The court applied the "single publication
rule" but approached the problem by treating it as a choice of law issue. Judge
Murphy held first that a multistate libel action does not present a choice of law
problem unless it is significantly related to more than one jurisdiction and, secondly,
its determination on the merits varies according to which related jurisdiction sup-
plies the governing internal substantive law.
It was conceded that the tort controversy was multistate in character, but "whether
internal law of related jurisdictions is significantly different, must remain conjectural
unless thorough canvass is made of the internal rules of all states within broadcast
range. We think that part of the office of conflict-of-laws is to obviate such investiga-
tion by making available rules for choice of governing law in controversies with
important contacts overflowing the boundaries of a single state."0 7
" Id. at 529. 9495 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. x95i).
" Id. at 938, 939- 1 5o5 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
"I1d. at 747-48.
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Judge Murphy then applied the substantive law of New York to determine
whether the complaint stated a cause of action. New York law governed because
it was the law of the forum, the point of origination of the broadcast, and the state
of principal circulation. The significance of this opinion in relationship to the
"single publication rule" is the apparent adoption of the Bernstein formula not
only for libel and slander, but also for other multistate torts-intentional infliction
of harm, negligent use of words, and "penumbral competitive torts," like trade
disparagement, trade libel, slander of goods, and injurious falsehood.
VI
UNFAIR COMPETITION
The extent to which the "single publication rule" has been invoked in the unfair
competition9s cases is aptly illustrated by Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting
Corporation,"9 which involved the telecasting of motion picture film of the 1939
Ettore-Joe Louis fight. An edited version of the fight was telecast on two different
occasions in 1949 and i95o over the nationwide facilities of the National Broadcasting
Company. Plaintiff sought damages in four states-Pennsylvania, New York, New
Jersey, and Delaware--claiming that he had never sold his television rights or con-
sented to the telecasts.
Plaintiff in his complaint invoked the privacy doctrine, the law of unfair compe-
tition, and a "kind of property right to the product of his services" for the unauthor-
ized exhibition of fight films. A preliminary issue before the court was whether
Ettore, who sold his motion picture rights in 1939, waived his property rights therein
and thus agreed in advance to any use, commercial or otherwise, to which the films
could be put. The court had some difficulty with this point, particularly as Ettore
did not expressly reserve rights against the televising of the films. Judge Biggs con-
cluded, however, that Ettore had impliedly reserved his television rights, on the
theory that at the time Ettore sold his motion picture rights, television was an un-
known medium, and, hence, fairness would seem to require the court to treat the
absence of this new or unknown medium as the equivalent of a reservation against
the use of his work product or performance.Y"
In holding that Ettore had a property right in his performance as a fighter and
hence could enjoin the telecasts, Judge Biggs commingled and confused all three
theories-privacy, unfair competition, and property right to the product of his
services. It would appear Ettore would be hard-pressed to rely on the privacy doc-
trine, which is primarily concerned with the protection of an individual's mental in-
terests against offense to his sensibilities caused by unwanted and unwarranted pub-
lication of his likeness or activity.'0 1 As the dissenting opinion points out, "As a
"s For a discussion of the extent to which the law of unfair competition is applicable to the content of
radio and television programs, see HARRY P. WARNER, RADIO AND) TELEVISION RIGHTS 889 et seq. (1953).
9 29 F.2d 481 (3 d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 35r U.S. 926 (1956).
.
0 See HARRY P. WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION RIGHTS 889 et seq. (953), and cases cited therein.
"
01
'Id. at 988. And see RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 14 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
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participant in a professional prize fight, Ettore was seeking as large an audience for
his performance as promotional skill could attract to ringside and theatres where
the fight films were subsequently exhibited. The addition of a television audience
cannot rationally be regarded as making the publication offensive to the per-
former."'1
02
The legal theory underlying Ettore's right of recovery is that he has some sort of
a property right in the product of his services; this is protected by the law of unfair
competition, which grants relief for the misappropriation to the commercial advant-
age of one person of a benefit or property right belonging to another.
To return to the interstate publication issues, Ettore claimed he was damaged in
four states-New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. The program was
telecast by NBC over its own New York station and by its Philco affiliate, WPTZ in
Philadelphia; 103 there were two telecasts of the Ettore-Louis fight-on December 30,
1949, and again on December 8, 195o . As discussed elsewhere, Pennsylvania does
not employ the Bernstein formula in its application of the "single publication rule."
The court is required to examine the law of each jurisdiction where the plaintiff
claims injury. Judge Biggs concluded, despite the paucity of case law, that New
York, Delaware, and New Jersey, in addition to Pennsylvania, would recognize a
cause of action in Ettore's behalf. Since there were two telecasts, separated a year
apart, Ettore had two causes of action.
The next question was whether the suit instituted in Pennsylvania would bar
litigation on the same causes of action in New Jersey and Delaware. Pennsylvania
is governed by the "single publication rule," as previously noted, but the law in that
jurisdiction requires the court to determine whether New Jersey and Delaware would
likewise apply the "single publication rule." Judge Biggs examined the laws of both
states and concluded that, despite no technical trace of any New Jersey or Delaware
law pertinent to the issue, public policy and logic warranted the conclusion that they
would follow the Pennsylvania "single publication rule." Hence, the "single publica-
tion rule" resulted in two separate causes of action (because of two telecasts of the
same program a year apart); and it engrossed the telecasts in New Jersey and Dela-
ware.
The NBC station in New York likewise telecast these programs. On the basis
of the stipulated facts before the court, it was alleged that Ettore's rights were violated
four times in New Jersey-twice by the Philadelphia station and twice by the New
York station. In this connection, it should be pointed out that NBC was not named
as a party to the suit; Chesebrough Manufacturing Company, the sponsor, was served
as a party defendant.
Judge Biggs held that since the New York and Pennsylvania telecasts took place
311 U.S. 712 (1940); Peterson v. KMTR Radio Corp., Civil No. 557, 555, Cal. Super. July 7, 1949, I8
U.S.L. WaEas 2044 (July 26, 1949).
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at the same time and since New York follows the "single publication rule," the
causes of action in New York and New Jersey against Chesebrough would be en-
grossed by the Pennsylvania suit. In other words, the causes of action against Chese-
brough in New York and Pennsylvania was merged, and plaintiff could recover
damages as a result of the New York telecast.
The court then referred to the fact that there were four telecasts in New Jersey.
It suggested that the telecasts from the New York station were seen in northern
New Jersey and from WPTZ, in southern New Jersey. "If Ettore is able to prove
that the telecasts were seen and heard in New York and by persons in the northern
part of New Jersey who did not view the Philco Pennsylvania telecasts, by reason of
the physical limitations imposed on television, he might be able to assert additional
elements of damage. '10 4
The Ettore case demonstrates the "ferocious task" confronting a court in applying
the Hartmann rule.'0 5 Not only was the court required to examine into the conflicts
of law rule of four states and ascertain the existence and application of 'the "single
publication rule," but the court had to determine the substantive law of all four
states as to the existence of causes of action. The court was in a for~st of but four
states deep; it would have been an impenetrable jungle were there fifteen states
involved.
VII
Tm RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The facts in Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co. warrant detailed analysis
because the various issues relating to the "single publication rule" were discussed by
Judge Keech in the lower court opinion. Bernstein sought compensatory and puni-
tive damages for invasion of his privacy by reason of a nationwide telecast in twenty-
nine jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia. Bernstein filed two suits: the
first was drafted on the single tort theory, viz., that the telecast over Station WNBW,
Washington, D. C., infringed his privacy; the second was drafted on the multiple
tort theory, i.e., that plaintiff was entitled to compensatory and punitive damages for
the publication of the tort in twenty-eight different states excluding the District of
Columbia. The telecast which was the basis of the instant litigation was the "Big
Story" program, consisting of film and live action and emanating from New York
City. The program was transmitted "live" to a minimum of thirty-eight stations;
ten stations telecast the program on a delayed basis via kineoscope recordings.
Plaintiff in the Bernstein case was domiciled in Virginia; he wds employed by the
War Department in Washington, D. C., and occupied a room in that city during the
work week.
The first issue confronting the court was the governing choice of law. Judge
10& 229 F.2d at 495-
105 Judge Biggs opened the Ettore opinioh with the following: "On this appeal we find ourselves
within that forest ruefully referred to by Judge Goodrich in Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co., 3 Cir. 1951,
192 F.2d 974, 975. The forest in this case, however, is only four states deep." >a29 F.2d at 483.
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Keech analyzed the privacy doctrine and concluded that the applicable governing
law should be the jurisdiction where plaintiff sustained injury. "The injury in these
cases: is the humiliation and outrage to plaintiff's feelings, resulting from the tele-
cast. '106  Since the impact of the multistate tort occurred in one place, the court
agreed to apply the law of that jurisdiction where plaintiff was when his feelings
were wounded.
The next issue before the court was whether it should apply the law of the
state of Virginia, where plaintiff was domiciled, or of Washington, D. C., where
the plaintiff had his dominant contacts. The objection to applying the law of Virginia
was the existence of a partly penal statute,'07 patterned after the New York law'08
and which undoubtedly would be strictly construed. The District of Columbia,
on the other hand, with but one or two cases dealing with the privacy doctrine,
would be governed by the common lawl'--much more flexible than its statutory
counterpart. In the Bernstein case, it was held that plaintiff had no cause of action,
since the disclosure of his past life involved matters of legitimate current public
interest. Judge Keech concluded that the foregoing result applied whether the
common law or its statutory counterpart governed. But on the issue, the court
concluded as a matter of law that the governing choice of law would be that of the
jurisdiction where plaintiff had his dominant contacts, in lieu of domicile.
The basic issue before the court was whether it should apply the "single publica-
tion rule." To quote Judge Keech: "If a tortious invasion of privacy be held to have
occurred, damages for the injury to plaintiff's feelings would be assessed under the
law of the one jurisdiction which is determined to have been his situs, but he could
recover there for the whole amount of harm inflicted on his feelings, considering,
among other factors, the extent of the publication or publications in that and other
jurisdictions."" 0 Significantly, in this Bernstein opinion, the court not only applied
the "single publication rule," but it applied the substantive law of the District of
Columbia for the twenty-eight jurisdictions where publication occurred.
The court's opinion left open the so-called "academic question,"--whether the
"single publication rule" encompassed telecasts on subsequent dates or at subsequent
times. No court has had occasion to discuss this problem in relation to radio or
television broadcasting. In the early days of television, kineoscope recordings were
in frequent use because of the absence of relay or microwave facilities between and
among stations. Today, most of the major markets across the country are inter-
connected through the facilities of the American Telephone & Telegraph Company.
However, because of the different time zones, programs on the West Coast are taped
... Id. at 825. 10" VA. CoDE ANN. § 5782 (1942).
S'N.Y. CrVIL RiOHos LAw §§ 5o and 51. See Levey v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 57 F. Supp.
40, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 2io N.Y. 51, 103 N.W. x7o8 (1913); Freed v. Loew's,
Inc., 175 Misc. 616, 24 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
1 Peed v. Washington Ti-mes Co., 55 Wash. L. Rep. (1927); Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F.
Supp. 3o5 (D.D.C. 1948); Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1946), afflrning 58 F. Supp.
484 (D.D.C. 1945).
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or kineoscoped for broadcasts at specified times. The advent of electronic tape sug-
gests that an increasing number of programs will be taped and distributed at more
convenient hours for a station's listening or viewing audience.
A sponsor who utilizes the facilities of a national network is presumably seeking
nationwide advertising for his product or services. The single distribution of the
program on the same day, but at different times during the day, to accommodate
the differences in time zones, would indicate that we are dealing with but one
nationwide publication, and hence a single tort. Similarly, if several stations are
precluded from carrying a specific program on the day that a majority of the stations
broadcast it, because of contractual commitments, but televise the specific program
within a reasonable period thereafter, it should likewise be treated as part of the
nationwide publication.
The foregoing tenders another problem. The initial telecast of a nationwide
program in thirty-four states occurs on March 20, 1957; the same telecast for five
stations occurs one month later. The statute of limitations issue is readily apparent,
particularly if the telecasts for the five stations enlarge the time for bringing suit.
There is no ready answer for the myriad problems which will confront a court
in its attempted application of the "single publication" or multiple-publication rules.




The need for the "single publication rule" is readily apparent. The interstate tort
with its multistate publications calls for such a doctrine. The logical development
of this doctrine suggests that the "single publication rule" be extended to authorize
a court's applying the law of one state for the publication in the other forty-seven
states. Practical considerations dictate such a development. If a court adheres to
the philosophy enunciated in the Ettore case, it will be in an impenetrable jungle
from which there is no escape. Limitations of time alone preclude a court from
examining the substantive and choice of law issues in a multistate defamation
action in forty-eight states. Furthermore, how can any court instruct a jury on the
varying laws, defenses, privileges, and damages of fory-eight states?
Despite the practical needs and demands for the "single publication rule," there
is an undefined constitutional law area which looms as an obstacle to the logical
extension of the "single publication" philosophy. To restate the issue, may a court,
in applying the "single publication rule," create a cause of action in those juris-
dictions which refuse to recognize a tort, e.g., invasion of privacy? Such jurisdiction
may have varying defenses or privileges which for all practical purposes nullify the
tort. The full faith and credit clause is not a sacrosanct and unyielding philosophy;
Thus, it is conceivable that this doctrine may be modified by the Supreme Court
to enable lower courts to deal with an intensely, practical problem which can only
be handled by the philosophy enunciated by the "single publication rule."
